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INTRODUCTION: 
On March 6, 2018, Just Eat PLC lost £728 million from its market 
value.1 The cause of this significant drop was the decision to utilize their 
soaring revenue to invest £50 million into new markets.2 Unilever PLC, a 
company that generates profits of around £5 billion a year, has attempted 
to leave the United Kingdom (UK) to be based solely in the Netherlands 
to protect itself from future takeover bids.3 Another company bought GKN 
                                                   
1 Aliya Ram, Just Eat shares slide after setting out £50m investment plan, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4494d6c2-2119-11e8-9efc-0cd3483b8b80. 
2 Id. £50 million was over 10% of the company’s value at the time. Id. 
3 Jonathan Guthrie, Unilever has chosen to protect itself from British capitalism, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d6807a36-284a-11e8-b27e-
cc62a39d57a0; Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Unilever chief admits Kraft Heinz bid forced 
compromises, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ea0218ce-1be0-11e8-
aaca-4574d7dabfb6. 
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PLC, an engineering company with 259 years of history.4 This buyer has 
the intention of selling GKN in three to five years for a profit.5 These three 
events are united by one thing: a crisis within the UK economy and its 
ability to think “long-term” when shareholder value consistently drives 
short-term considerations. This in turn has been linked to the UK 
productivity problem,6 or productivity puzzle,7 which the most recent 
research shows is linked to a slowdown in productivity growth from the 
largest and most productive firms.8 The Bank of England has suggested 
that decreased UK productivity growth is most likely due to a lack of 
investment.9 This is not just a lack of investment in research and 
development, although the UK lags behind its competitors in that area as 
well,10 but also in implementing the results of the research and 
development and thus causing a loss of productivity growth.11 This issue 
has gone beyond a concern of the financial press and is now a political 
concern, with statements on investing in the long term, encouraging 
innovation, and spurring productivity—all of which are found in both of 
the UK’s largest political parties’ manifestos12 and political speeches.13 
                                                   
4 Peggy Hollinger, Michael Pooler & Jim Pickard, Melrose victorious in hostile bid for 
GKN, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
c6afe24c-3356-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498. 
5 Id. 
6 International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP), final estimate: 2015, OFF. OF NAT’L 
STAT. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/ 
economicoutputandproductivity/productivitymeasures/bulletins/internationalcomparisons
ofproductivityfinalestimates/2015. 
7 Edward Curwen, UK productivity back at pre-crisis level, BBC (Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37574985; Jasper Jolly, Productivity puzzle remains or 
economists despite UK growth in third quarter of 2016, CITY A.M. (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.cityam.com/256509/productivity-puzzle-remains-economists-despite-uk-growth; The 
Guardian view on productivity: Britain must solve the puzzle, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2017/apr/09/the-guardian-view-on-productivity-britain-must-solve-the-puzzle. 
8 Patrick Schneider, The UK’s productivity puzzle is in the top tail of the distribution, BANK 
UNDERGROUND (Mar. 29, 2018), https://bankunderground.co.uk/2018/03/29/ 
the-uks-productivity-puzzle-is-in-the-top-tail-of-the-distribution/. 
9 Id. 
10 JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG TERM 
DECISION MAKING: FINAL REPORT 14–16 (July 2012), 
http://www.ecgi.org/conferences/eu_actionplan2013/documents/kay_review_final_report.pdf.  
11 Alina Barnett et al., The UK productivity puzzle 122–123, BANK OF ENG. (2014), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0154/fb17c0aa098eefd70990caf7cf0783910ced.pdf. 
12 For the Many Not the Few 17, THE LABOUR PARTY (2017), https://labour.org.uk/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf (“When shareholders are looking 
for quick short-term returns, they encourage companies to cut corners 
. . . instead of investing for the long term . . . .”); “[The government] must address the UK’s 
slow productivity growth . . . .” Prime Minister Theresa May, The Conservative and Unionist Party, 
Forward, Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future 20 (2017) (“[The 
government] must address the UK’s slow productivity growth . . . .”); Id. at 19 (“We will work hard 
to ensure we have a regulatory environment that encourages innovation.”). 
13 See Prime Minister Theresa May, Speech in Birmingham: We can make Britain a country 
that works for everyone (July 11, 2016) (“If we are going to have an economy that works for everyone 
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Therefore, regardless which side of the political spectrum power rests, the 
issues of investment, productivity, and takeovers14 are paramount. These 
issues could be linked to capital markets transferring short-termist 
mentalities into the boardroom of UK companies through the market for 
corporate control and the UK’s takeover regulation.15 In short, the 
Takeover Code that regulates the UK market for corporate control does 
not allow any behaviour by a target company’s board that would prevent 
its shareholders from deciding on the merits of a possible takeover bid.16 
In light of this, scholars have argued that unlike jurisdictions that do allow 
takeover defences or are not susceptible to takeovers to the same extent, 
UK companies are preoccupied with producing short-term returns over 
and above long-term profit generation.17 This may be a fundamental 
element contributing to a dearth of investment, and consequently labour 
productivity that has hardly grown for nearly ten years.18 
The purpose of this paper is to argue how reforming the UK 
takeover and merger rules can lead to greater long-term investment by UK 
firms, while causing commensurate growth in productivity without 
hindering overseas investment or entrenching inefficient management. 
In order to analyze this problem, this paper will be broken into the 
following elements. The first part will set out the theoretical basis for the 
corporate control market transferring a short-termist mindset to UK 
boardrooms, which will be contrasted with the United States of America 
(US), French, Austrian, and German positions. These jurisdictions have 
been selected because each represents a developed economy with an 
alternative approach to UK merger regulation. The second part will 
analyze the suggestion that the UK Takeover Code address these issues. 
The final part will offer a new solution incorporating insights gained from 
behavioural economics: reform the regulation of takeovers to account for 
the predicable irrationalities in the human decision-making process. In so 
                                                   
. . . that means . . . doing something radical [about takeovers].”) (transcript available at 
http://press.conservatives.com/ 
post/147947450370/we-can-make-britain-a-country-that-works-for). 
14 See Forward, Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future, supra 
note 12, at 17 (“We welcome overseas investment and want investors to succeed here but not when 
success is driven by aggressive asset-stripping or tax avoidance. We will update the rules that govern 
mergers and takeovers. This will require careful deliberation . . . .”). 
15 François Derrien, Ambrus Kecskés & David Thesmar, Investor Horizons and Corporate 
Polices, 48 J. OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1755 (2013); see also Jonathan Guthrie, 
Unilever Has Chosen to Protect Itself from British Capitalism, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d6807a36-284a-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0; Michael Skapinker, The 
Shareholder-First Corporate Model Erodes Public Support, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/fd702c36-206b-11e8-9efc-0cd3483b8b80.  
16 See id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Gaganan Awano et. al., UK Productivity Introduction: April to June 2017, OFF. FOR 
NAT’L STAT. (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/labourproductivity/articles/ukpr
oductivityintroduction/aprtojune2017 (noting that in 2016, output per hour had returned to its pre-
downturn level and had slightly exceeded it for the first time since 2008). 
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doing, this reform will allow companies to invest on a long-term basis 
without fearing being taken over as a consequence—a solution based on 
reforming the non-frustration rule, so that companies may request 
authorization from their shareholders to deploy defensive measures for a 
particular time period, such as five years. This paper will argue that this 
reform would not only maintain the shareholder primacy that is so 
fundamental to British19 corporate control culture, but also assist company 
directors in planning ahead and investing securely in the knowledge that 
they will not be replaced merely because they prioritize delivering long 
term results. 
 
I. THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM WITH THE MARKET FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
To begin, it is necessary to consider the theory of how markets 
function, particularly for shares and corporate control markets. The 
seminal principle explaining this market’s behaviour derives from the 
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which explains that an efficient 
market reflects all the information available in share prices.20 Further, 
beyond a theoretical stance, this is a proposed model for how financial 
markets in the real world actually function. 
The assumptions required for this theory to work are that investors 
are rational and rationally value securities, meaning they should value a 
firm’s shares based on the present value of its future cash flow once the 
investors factor in any associated risks. When new information becomes 
available—for example, an increase or decrease in the future cash flow—
it disseminates through the market and the price of the shares adjust 
accordingly.21 Where investors are not rational, their behaviour is assumed 
as irrational in a random manner causing their irrationality to balance out; 
for example, if fifty investors over value and stock and fifty under value, 
a roughly equal dispersal of shares should cancel this out.22 Also, rational 
investors cancel out irrational investors’ actions23 because if a particular 
share’s price irrationally increases, then the rational shareholders will 
realize this share is overpriced and that they can profit from the situation, 
                                                   
19  See infra Part I.A. In this instance, British will be used as a term to include the whole of 
the UK, not just the British Isles. 
20 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 
J. OF FIN. 383 (1970). 
21 See id. at 37. 
22 Id. 
23 MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECON. 159 (U. of Chi. Press, 1953); Eugene F. 
Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. OF BUS. 34 (1965).  
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so they will sell this share and buy a similar, but appropriately valued one. 
Rational investors selling shares will then cause the share price to return 
to normal, at which point the selling will stop.24 The theory is further based 
upon the foundational assumptions of neo-classical economics: that the 
world is largely populated by homo economicus—an economically 
rational man who maximises his utility, has unlimited information 
processing power, and holds preferences that are stable.25 This will be 
discussed in further detail below.  
The consequence of this theory in relation to takeover regulation 
is that shareholders in a particular firm will only accept an offer for a 
takeover if the price paid is superior to what the company is worth (taking 
into account future cash flow and risk). Likewise, a takeover offer will 
only be higher than the current value of the company if the takeover will 
make the combined entity more profitable—through cost savings and 
economies of scale, for example. These two points combined mean that if 
the EMH is accurate, a takeover offer will only be made and accepted if 
the proposed takeover is efficient. That is to say that the takeover will 
create value that will not exist if the firms remain separate. It follows from 
the above theory that shareholders should be the arbiters of whether or not 
the company in which they hold shares should be taken over. If the 
takeover will generate value, the price will represent this. If the takeover 
will not generate value, the offer price will also reflect this and there will 
be no reason to sell the shares on. Interference with this right to accept or 
reject a takeover will, according to the EMH, result in inefficient results 
where companies are not sold when they will create value or are sold when 
they will not.26 Within this context, the next step is to consider the current 
UK regulatory framework for takeovers. 
 
A. The UK Takeover Code 
In the UK, the market for corporate control is regulated by the 
Takeover Panel and the body of rules it maintains, namely, the Takeover 
Code.27 One of the most interesting aspects of the Takeover Code is that it 
almost completely prohibits a company that is the target of a takeover from 
engaging in any sort of behaviour that will prevent that takeover.28 The 
part of the Takeover Code that is of relevance here is the non-frustration 
rule. The code states: 
 
                                                   
24 Id. 
25 See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOUR (16th ed.  1953); ROBERT FRANK & EDWARD CARTWRIGHT, MICROECONOMICS AND 
BEHAVIOUR 56 (2013); HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 3 (9th ed. 2014).  
26 See Fama, supra note 20. 
27 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018. 
28 Unless given a mandate to do so by its shareholders. 
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During the course of an offer, or even before the date of the 
offer if the board of the offeree company has reason to believe 
that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the board must not, 
without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting: (a) 
take any action which may result in any offer or bona fide 
possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied 
the opportunity to decide on its merits . . .. 29 
 
What this means in practice is that the board of a target company 
is not able to take any action that would prevent the shareholders of the 
target company from deciding to accept the potential offer. This is a 
remarkable rule and one that places the UK market for corporate control 
in an unusual position. This position is one of almost unrivalled exposure 
to takeovers from non-UK companies, including hostile takeovers.30 This 
is partly due to the rule and partly due to the make-up of shareholders in 
UK companies—best understood through a brief comparison with other 
jurisdictions. 
 
B. Comparison with Other Jurisdictions’ Rules. 
 
In the US, there is no law corresponding to the non-frustration 
rule. Instead, it is common for US companies to deploy “poison pill” 
defences.31 In these, if a bidder who has not been approved by the board 
crosses a particular threshold of voting shares, all shareholders, excluding 
the unapproved bidder, are given the right to purchase new shares at a 
significant discount to the trading price.32 This dilutes the shareholding of 
the potential new owner and prevents them from obtaining control.33 As a 
consequence, companies in the US are placed in a position where they 
have significant control over potential takeovers, and therefore, if 
investing large amount of capital into long term projects, they may be less 
likely to feel exposed to a takeover threat. This is not to say there is no 
short-term pressure on public companies,34 but that there is still a greater 
level of control over it than in the UK jurisdiction. 
                                                   
29 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, D2, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018. 
30 See infra section I.B. 
31 Suzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 THE BUS. LAWYER 423 
(1987). 
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 Concern for corporate short-termism has also been brought to the fore in the US, not 
least through the concerns of US President Trump. See, e.g. Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson & Mamta 
Badkar, Trump asks SEC to Study Scrapping Quarterly Earnings Reports, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 
17, 2018); John Authers, Trump is Right to Push Debate on Quarterly Reporting, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 2018). These concerns are also evident in the attempts of Elon Musk to take Tesla Inc. 
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Another example of how companies in other jurisdictions are 
likely to be less concerned about takeover threats can be seen in France. 
State intervention in mergers and acquisitions in France are 
commonplace.35 This is in contrast to the UK where intervention is rare.36 
Whether formally or informally, France has repeatedly intervened and 
disapproved of numerous control transactions when the target is seen to be 
of “strategic” importance.37 But this term has been interpreted very 
broadly indeed, covering varying sectors, from more obvious candidates 
of strategic importance such as energy to more surprising sectors, such as 
the business of producing yogurt.38 This means that once again, the 
situation of a leading firm in France is very different from the situation 
present in the UK, as there is a far greater possibility of a takeover being 
blocked by the government should a takeover attempt occur.39 
In Austria, there is also a non-frustration rule;40 however, the 
shareholder make-up in Austria is significantly different to that of the UK. 
In Austria, the major companies tend to have a significant controlling 
shareholder which renders takeovers impossible without their consent.41 
Contrast this with the UK where major companies tend to be held by a 
vastly diversified shareholder group.42 UK firms tend to have low single-
digit percentile shareholders.43 This means that unlike in Austria, it is very 
easy for a potential bidder to purchase shares and build up a controlling 
interest, thus making hostile takeovers possible. 
Germany has had, until recently, a relatively open market toward 
foreign takeovers, but now this is becoming slightly more restricted.44 The 
                                                   
private to allow the company to make decisions that are right “for the long term.”  Elon Musk, Taking 
Tesla Private, https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/blog/taking-tesla-private? (last visited Sep. 5, 2018); see 
also Arash Massoudi, Richard Waters & James Fontanella-Khan, Elon Musk Declares Plan to Take 
Tesla Private, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018); Shannon Bond & James Fontanella-Khan, Electric 
Carmaker Founder Drops Buyout Plan, Saying His Investors Told Him: “Don’t do this”, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, (Aug. 25, 2018). 
35 Andreas Heinemann, Government Control of Cross-Border M&A: Legitimate 
Regulation or Protectionism?, 15(3) J. INT’L ECON. L. 843. 
36 S. Dinc & I. Erel, Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions, 68(6) J. OF FIN. 
2471, 2480 (2013). 
37 Heinemann, supra note 35, at 848–849. 
38 See Deborah Orr, Danone: Not for Sale, FORBES (June 25, 2005), 
https://www.forbes.com/2005/07/25/danone-pepsi-takeover-cz_do_ 
0725danone.html (where it is stated that French legislators considered the idea of Danone 
being purchased by Pepsi Co “scandalous”). 
39 Heinemann, supra note 35. 
40 See the Austrian Takeover Act at https://unternehmensrecht.univie.ac.at/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/i_unternehmensrecht/Lehre/WS_2015-
16/Kurse/Stockenhuber/030681_MuA_I/Austrian_Takeover_Act_englisch.pdf. 
41 KERSHAW, infra note 59 at 356. 
42 Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, OFF. NAT’L STAT. (2014), 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshar
es/2015-09-02. 
43 B. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS 
TRANSFORMED (2008). 
44 See Guy Chazan, Germany expands powers to block takeovers, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 
12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5087c106-66fc-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe; Melanie Hall, 
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German government has recently passed a directive increasing their ability 
to block non-EU companies from acquiring more than 25% of a company 
where the takeover could endanger “critical infrastructure.”45  The original 
state of the law only allowed for takeovers to be prevented if they were a 
threat to national security or public order.46 The new language can cover a 
far broader array of companies, for example if they write software for 
power plants, energy and water supply networks, electronic payments, 
hospitals and transport systems in addition to defence and surveillance 
companies.47 It also extends the amount of time the government has to 
investigate takeovers.48 This change of heart is largely prompted by two 
takeover attempts. This first was the successful takeover of Augsburg 
robot manufacturer KUKA by the Chinese company Midea.49 This went 
ahead despite the resistance of the then Finance Minister, Sigmar 
Gabriel.50 The second takeover over was of computer chip equipment 
manufacturer AIXTRON, which failed due to US security concerns since 
AIXTRON also supplies the arms industry.51 It is notable that, while 
ostensibly this move was wholly about protecting the wider infrastructure 
that supports national security, Economics Minister Brigitte Zypries said 
at the time that she paid attention to “fair competition” and that German 
companies often competed with countries whose economic systems were 
not as open as theirs.52 So once again, even in an economy as free and open 
as Germany’s, it appears that there is an increasing scope for firms to be 
protected from unwanted takeovers. 
In summary, UK companies are more open to non-UK hostile 
takeovers than comparable national firms in other jurisdictions. UK firms 
tend to have a large number of shareholders rather than a single controlling 
shareholder.53 At least since 2012, UK firms possess a majority of 
                                                   
Germany moves to block takeovers by foreign investors, THE TELEGRAPH (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/07/12/germany-moves-block-takeovers-foreign-
investors/. 
45 Verordnung, Neunte Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, 
Bundesregierung. Section 55. 
46 See e.g. Chazan, supra note 44. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Edward Taylor, China’s Midea receives U.S. green light for Kuka takeover, REUTERS 
(Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kuka-m-a-mideamidea-group/chinas-midea-
receives-u-s-green-light-for-kuka-takeover-idUSKBN14J0SP. 
50 Amie Tsang, Midea of China Moves a Step Closer to Takeover of Kuka of Germany, 
N.Y. TIMES (July, 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/business/ 
dealbook/germany-china-midea-kuka-technology-robotics.html. 
51 Regierung will Übernahmen strenger prüfen, SÜEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/ 
2017/20170712-zypries-besserer-schutz-bei-firmenuebernahmen.html. 
52  Id. 
53 Cheffins, supra note 43, at 1. 
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shareholders who are not UK citizens,54 meaning control is not just de-
centralised in terms of number, but also in geography. Further, due to the 
non-frustration rule, (as well as other corporate laws) there is nothing a 
UK firm can do to prevent a hostile takeover.55 This situation gave rise to 
the criticism that due to the relatively high chance of being subject to the 
interest of a bidder, combined with the inability to prevent hostile bids, 
UK boards are overly concerned with protecting their position through the 
only real means possible: producing results from one period to the next. If 
this is the case then it may be a contributing factor that influences the UK’s 
lower R&D spend56 and lower productivity.57 But is this actually a 
reasonable argument? If a company invests large amounts into R&D, will 
this not be taken into account by traders when evaluating the value of the 
company? If a company invests millions of pounds into a long-term 
project, assuming that project at some point yields fruit, capital will be 
returned to investors and that should be priced in.58 
 However, Kershaw insightfully argued that there are a several 
reasons why markets may not correctly evaluate the value of long term 
projects.59 These are as follows: (a) managers cannot disclose great 
amounts of detail about projects if it would devalue the project; (b) the 
longer term the investment and the type of research may mean that there 
is a higher level of uncertainty associated with long term investments over 
and above short term cash, this may decrease the share price in the short 
term and cause concern for fund managers focused on the short term; (c) 
shareholders may have difficulty trusting the assessment of boards when 
considering a project’s profitability.60 This is because, should a manager 
be taken to court for misleading disclosures regarding a project, they will 
likely be given greater scope if their projections do not come true as the 
project stretches further into the future. If this is the case, managers may 
feel they can exaggerate the future success of a project and consequently, 
shareholders may not feel they can trust such predictions in the same way 
that they can trust a prediction that comes to fruition in two years.61 
Consequently, there may be good reasons why investors are unable to 
accurately assess the value of long term investments, and therefore, may 
tend to favour short-term returns instead. 
                                                   
54 See Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, supra note 42. 
55 KERSHAW, infra note 59 at 334–337. 
56 See Kay, supra note 10 (establishing low levels on investment and R&D by UK 
corporations and low levels compared to other developed economies). 
57 International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP), final estimate: 2015, OFF. FOR 
NAT’L STAT., https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/ 
productivitymeasures/bulletins/internationalcomparisonsofproductivityfinalestimates/201
5 (last visited June 23, 2017). 
58 Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism – In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 97 
BUS. LAWYER 977 (March 15, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239132. 
59 DAVID KERSHAW, PRINCIPLES OF TAKEOVER REGULATION 28 (2016). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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There is also a potential issue linked to the increase in fund 
management.62 Fund managers are given funds by investors through the 
comparison of their recent performance with other fund managers.63 An 
investor considering which fund to deposit their capital in is likely to 
consider the fund manager who has obtained a 35% return in the last two 
quarters as superior to one who has obtained only 10% in the same period. 
It stands to reason then that the fund managers with the highest relative 
return will receive the most money to manage and consequently earn the 
most commission/fees. This may drive fund managers to prioritise short 
term profit, which in particular will encourage aiming to have the highest 
performance at the next bench-marking date. After all, there may be little 
benefit in achieving a 50% return in ten years if there are significant net-
outflows of capital in the nine years prior. This may drive short-term 
focused behaviour amongst fund managers, and this may result in short 
term focused behaviour in the market for corporate control.64  
This is supported by recent evidence that suggests that relative 
performance evaluation drives herding behaviour amongst investor 
portfolios. Herding behaviour is possible because institutional investors 
know more about their peers’ trades than retail investors.65 Evaluation 
based on fund managers’ performance relative to their peers has been 
argued to produce an obvious incentive to herd.66 Given that institutional 
                                                   
62 See generally FUNDS UNDER MANAGEMENT, THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/fund-statistics/funds-under-
management.html?what=graph&show=4. 
63 See Kay, supra note 10. 
64 Consider the following by way of illustration: Two fund managers both invest £500,000 
in “Company A.” Company A becomes subject of a potential takeover bid for 200p. This undervalues 
Company A’s long-term value by 15%. During the takeover period the share price moves from 150p 
to 190p. This would not be unusual, as often the price moves towards the offer price subject to a 
discount that signifies the chance of the deal falling through. Fund manager one sells his shares at 
190p. Fund manager two now suffers a difficult choice. If he sells his shares either during the bid of 
before he will gain a profit but will lose out in the long term due to the undervalued purchase price. 
However, if he doesn’t sell his shares and the deal falls through then the share price will likely drop 
down to the pre-bid level, approximately 150p. Should this happen at the next point where fund 
manager one and two are benchmarked against each other, fund manager one will have benefited from 
significant gains in the share price (despite selling below value) whereas fund manager two will have 
gained nothing from the failed bid at all despite valuing the price of the shares correctly. This would 
no doubt look unfavourable in terms of comparative benchmarking and potentially lose business for 
fund manager two, despite his accurate long-term assessment of value. See KERSHAW, supra note 59, 
at 344.  
65 See Abhijit Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J . ECON. 797 (1992); 
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and 
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 992 (1992).  
66 Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319 (1985); 
David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 
(1990). However, also consider how the flow of information between fund managers within their 
social network leads to investment patterns, which in themselves become self-reinforcing. Les 
Coleman, Facing Up to Fund Managers: An Exploratory Field Study of how Institutional Investors 
make Decisions, 7 QUALITATIVE RES. FIN. MKTS. 111, 121 (2015); Johan Henningsson, Fund 
Managers as Cultured Observers, QUALITATIVE RES. FIN. MKTS. 27 (2009). 
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investors are of such a size that their investment decisions can in fact 
influence the market,67 this is highly significant. There is now sufficient 
empirical evidence to suggest that such herding occurs in mutual funds,68 
hedge funds,69 and pension funds.70 Additionally, there is evidence to 
suggest that fund managers are well aware that even good long term 
decisions can result in the loss of clients when they produce poor short 
term results.71 One empirical study of fund managers’ behaviour goes so 
far as to state that “[v]irtually all managers saw the sell decision as harder 
than choosing which stocks to buy, and also see this as an area where they 
are prone to behavioural biases.”72 This is all the more significant when 
considering the bid price of takeovers, where instead of evaluating long-
term value, shareholders appear to consider bids through anchored 
expectations based upon historical prices.73 
 
II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SHORT-TERMISM PROBLEM 
 
There are a number of potential solutions to the short-termism 
problem. The government could intervene to a greater extent to protect 
companies where it believes that it is in the nation’s economic interest, 
short-term shareholders could be disenfranchised of their votes, or the 
acceptance threshold for a merger could be increased. The respective 
merits of these possibilities will now be considered. 
 
                                                   
67 See Louis K. C. Chan & Josef Lakonishok, The Behavior of Stock Prices Around 
Institutional Trades, 50 J. FIN. 1147 (1995); Patrick J. Dennis, Deon Strickland, Who Blinks in Volatile 
Markets, Individuals or Institutions?, 57 J. FIN. 1923 (2002). 
68 Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman & Russ Wermers, Momentum Investment Strategies, 
Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1088 
(1995); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Trading and the Impact on Stock Prices, 54 J. FIN. 581 (1999); 
Joshua Coval & Erik Stafford, Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in Equity Markets, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 
479 (2007). 
69 Richard Sias, H. J. Turtle & Blerina Zykaj, Hedge Fund Crowds and Mispricing, 62 
MGMT. SCI. 764 (2015). 
70 David Blake, Lucio Sarno & Gabriele Zinna, The Market for Lemmings: The Investment 
Behavior of Pension Funds, 36 J. FIN. MKT. 17 (2017); Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer & Robert 
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71 Richard J. Taffler, Crawford Spence & Arman Eshraghi, Emotional Economic Man: 
Calculation and Anxiety in Fund Managers, 61 ACCT. ORG. SOC’Y 53 (2017). An interview with one 
fund manager yielded the following response: “short-term numbers . . . you know that's noise. People 
aren’t stupid but even though they know that, commercially it’s sometimes very difficult to behave in 
a way that’s rational. In a long-term sense what’s rational in terms of investment behaviour may not 
be rational commercially. That’s the problem.” And further, discussing when a manager takes an 
appropriate long term view but the short term results do not impress your client “even if you were 
completely convinced you were right, even if you don't panic, your employer might panic or your 
clients might panic in which case, to be honest, bad luck.” Id. 
72 Les Coleman, Facing Up To Fund Managers: An exploratory field study of how 
institutional investors make decisions, 7 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN FIN. MKTS., 111, 127 (2015). 
73 Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Effect of Reference Point Prices on 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 49 (2012); Chip Heath, Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, 
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A. Government Intervention 
 
The first possibility is also the easiest to reject. If investors cannot 
accurately evaluate the value of an investment, it is difficult to see why a 
government would be any better. Even if it is assumed that a firm is 
undervalued due to a long-term investment that is not being valued 
properly, it is difficult to see how this would be established objectively. 
There would also be the potential for generating moral hazard.74 If a 
government selects a particular company to be considered of such 
economic import to the nation to prevent it being taken over, this may 
signal to the board of that company that they are “too big to fail” or at least 
“too important to fail.”75 This could result in the company becoming more 
wasteful, increasing agency costs, taking unnecessary risks, or other 
behaviour that reduces competitiveness.76 This is due to the belief that 
should things go wrong, the government will intervene because of their 
economic importance.77 
In the alternative, if the government did not focus on value to 
shareholders, but rather intervened when there was a general economic 
interest at stake or when a “strategic” industry was at risk, there would 
then be the risk that “strategic” would take on a particularly flexible 
meaning as it does presently in France.78 In addition, as signified by the 
takeover of Cadbury’s79 by Kraft in 2010, the amount of pressure a 
government can be under to intervene in a merger may not be 
proportionate to the company’s strategic value to the country in which it 
is headquartered. As a consequence, direct government intervention would 
be liable to result in haphazard intervention on more political than 
economic motivations. 
 
B. Disenfranchising Shareholders 
 
An idea put forward by Sir Roger Carr, the previous chairman of 
Cadbury Plc, was that certain shareholders could have their votes removed 
                                                   
74 Ning Gong & Kenneth Jones, Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated 






79 An extremely popular confectionary company based in the UK. 
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when it came to hostile takeovers.80 This proposal first requires an 
explanation of the current problem as seen by Sir Roger Carr. When 
Cadbury was subject to a bid by the US firm Kraft Foods, Cadbury initially 
resisted the bid considering it to be undervalued. Resisting the takeover 
was very difficult, however, because Carr found that once a potential bid 
was announced, merger arbitrageurs would buy into the company for the 
single purpose of completing the deal, and then making a profit when the 
deal goes through; the profit being the difference between the market price 
of the shares bought and the offer price for the shares in the takeover.81 
There is usually a gap between the two values which represents the risk 
that the deal will not be completed. The difficulty with this is that once a 
certain number of shares are acquired for this purpose, it becomes all but 
impossible for the board to resist a bid. This is because the merger 
arbitrageurs are not interested in holding a long position in the company, 
their plan to make a quick profit is dependent upon the deal being 
completed. This means the board of the target will have very unreceptive 
ears when trying to convince the shareholders to refuse the offer. If these 
new shareholders are disenfranchised, then the decision would rest with 
the shareholders with a long position, and as such those who are likely to 
have the long-term interests of the company at heart. 
Kershaw has argued however that such an idea misses the 
problem.82 He argues that if merger arbitrageurs have ownership of shares 
this is because the original shareholders who did have long positions felt 
that it was worth selling their shares. If this was because the offer price 
represented good value this is not an issue, but if, as described above, this 
is a result of short-termism by fund managers seeking to enhance their 
relative performance then the underlying problem will still exist.83 This is 
because there is a risk that even if shares are disenfranchised, if merger 
arbitrageurs still buy the shares (despite knowing that they cannot vote on 
the offer) this will push the share price up. If this happens then fund 
managers will still feel they have to sell in order to ensure they benefit 
from the increase in price brought about by the bid. It is only if the 
disenfranchisement of shares bought during the bid discourages investors 
from buying shares that this change would have any effect. This is because 
if investors do not buy the shares the price will not rise up to near the offer 
level and so there will be no incentive for fund managers to sell if the bid 
is undervalued. This result may be unlikely if merger arbitrageurs and 
                                                   
80 Amy Wilson, UK takeover threshold should be raised, says chairman Roger Carr, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/ 
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82 KERSHAW, supra note 59 at 362. 
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investors are generally aware of the incentive to sell that will be created if 
they buy shares from fund managers and push up the price.84 
 
C. Increasing the Acceptance Threshold for Takeover Acceptance 
 
Another suggestion to resolve the issue, put forward by Carr, is to 
increase the threshold for takeover acceptance.85 Once again, this idea is 
premised on the problem that once an offer is made, shares are sold into 
the market by long-term shareholders and bought by merger arbitrageurs 
that hope to profit from the difference between their purchase price and 
that of the offer. Carr considered that if the threshold was increased to 
above 50% then this would reduce the risk of new shareholders being 
decisive in overriding the wishes of the long-term shareholders.86 In 
theory, if the threshold is high enough and the number of shareholders who 
have a long-term view great enough, then their votes will be determinative 
of whether or not the deal goes through, rather than the votes of the merger 
arbitrageurs being determinative. This suggestion has been commended,87 
it has been argued that such a policy would not only be consistent with the 
non-frustration rule88 but further that it would make the theory upon which 
the rule was founded a reality, which is that shareholders make their 
decisions based upon the long-term value of the shares and consequently, 
the company.89 This is because it empowers those shareholders who 
actually work on this basis and effectively neuters, or at least weakens, the 
influence of those who do not. 
 Whilst providing a useful insight into the matter, this proposal 
may be missing the underlying issue. The proposal looks to which 
shareholders are making the decision rather than considering when they 
are making the decision. In essence, it assumes that there is a large body 
of shareholders who are incentivised to sell their shares because of relative 
performance bench marks whose shares are bought by those only 
interested in a quick profit through the deal going ahead while 
simultaneously there is a core of long-term shareholders who are 
genuinely interested in the company’s long-term welfare and are not 
swayed by short-term incentives. In reality, it may be that all shareholders, 
whether retail investors or fund managers, are in a position where they are 
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required to wrestle with the conflict between of short-term and long-term 
perspectives. It is at this point it becomes very helpful to consider the 
issues through the lens of behavioural economics. 
 
III. A NEW SOLUTION 
 
A. Viewing the problem through behavioural economics 
 
Historically, economic theory has been founded upon the model 
of “rational choice” economics.90 This model is based on some well-
established assumptions. Rational choice theory assumes that customers 
enter the market with well-defined preferences and then considering the 
prices as given, they allocate their resources in order to best satisfy their 
preferences.91 This core principle is often phrased in the following way: 
when market actors such as buyers and sellers are optimising, they will 
choose to use their capital to acquire the best products and services in the 
best combination that suits them.92 Companies or firms are also considered 
to be rational and optimizing, but rather than seeking to satiate particular 
wants or needs, they are assumed to make their decisions in order to 
maximise profits.93 When these two actors interact on a competitive 
market where prices are free, prices are altered in a way such a way that 
supply equals demand. This is to say that markets naturally reach an 
equilibrium.94 They will do this in a logical and rational fashion, thus 
providing the basis for “rational choice” theory. 
The difficulty with rational choice theory is that recently, the idea 
that humans are rational in their choices has been significantly 
undermined. That is not to say that humans are unpredictable, mad, or have 
no interest in optimizing the use of their resources. Rather, what this means 
is that humans tend to make predictable behavioural choices that are 
consistent, but logically flawed from the point of view of the rational 
choice model of economics. This is for a number of reasons. One of these 
reasons was identified very early on by Herbert A. Simon.95 Simon noted 
that rather than pursuing an optimal outcome, humans—as a result of the 
increasingly complex decisions and the inability to calculate every 
possible outcome—would depend on heuristics or trial-and-error to find a 
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satisfactory outcome.96 Decisions then were made within a “bounded 
rationality.”97 This was further supported by Tversky and Kahneman, two 
key figures considering behaviour in the field of psychology. They found 
humans made consistent, predictable errors of judgement due to their 
reliance on certain heuristics and their underlying biases.98 These 
heuristics and biases meant that humans are not only not optimising in 
certain situations, but rather they make predicable mistakes of judgment.99 
A particularly important finding of Kahneman and Tversky was 
that humans dislike losses more than they like gains.100 For example, the 
enjoyment or satisfaction of gaining £1,000 is not the same as the amount 
of dissatisfaction that is felt if the same person lost £1,000. Further study 
quantified the ratio, indicating that people dislike losses twice as much as 
they like gains.101 A simple illustration could be as follows: a retailer 
receives a new card machine that allows his customers to pay by credit 
card. However, he is charged by the bank for each payment made by credit 
card, so he passes the charge on to the customer. He can set a fee of £1.00 
for the use of the card or he could offer a £1.00 discount for those 
customers that use cash. Depending on which wording he uses, the 
outcome is essentially the same. From a rational choice point of view, the 
expectation would be that there would be no greater or fewer users of a 
card regardless of the phraseology, either a customer considers that it is 
worth £1 to use their card or they do not. As an optimiser, the way the offer 
is presented is irrelevant. However in reality such situations yield different 
results. Richard Thaler, professor of economics at the University of 
Chicago and recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, noticed a number 
of strange behaviours exhibited by market actors which suggested that 
they were not acting according the the rational choice model.102 Thaler 
began looking into what biases and behaviours existed that caused market 
actors to depart from rational choice theory and this developed into what 
is now known as behavioural economics.103 Much of the work in 
behavioural economics focuses on demonstrating which factors—ones 
that would normally be considered irrelevant from a rational choice point 
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of view—are in fact highly relevant in predicting market actors’ 
behaviour.104 This helps produce models of behaviour that are a more 
accurate reflection of reality. By producing more accurate models, it 
becomes possible to shape law and policy in such a way as to produce 
better results or from an economic perspective, more efficient results.105 
Such changes have been implemented in various jurisdictions 106 and are 
now commonly known as “nudges,” a term coined by Sunstein and Thaler 
in their book of the same name.107 Nudges do not restrict the freedom of 
an individual but rather “nudges” them toward the more efficient outcome, 
a term coined as libertarian paternalism.108 This is extremely pertinent 
when there is a certain conduct that is regulated and the behaviour is linked 
to an inefficient outcome, such as market failure. 
The application of such behavioural economics insights can 
explain various anomalies that exist within finance.109 However, until now, 
such insights have not been considered in relation to takeover regulation 
and its effect on short-termist behaviour. In this paper, behavioural 
economics is used to identify an underlying bias for which rational choice 
models take no account in the market for corporate control. It is then used 
to posit a major reform of the Takeover Code to reframe the regulation so 
as to avoid this underlying bias and the failure that it causes. 
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 It is not necessary to discuss each and every bias that has been 
identified in the behavioural economics literature here.110 For the purposes 
of this paper, it is only necessary is to consider the biases that will 
influence a shareholder’s decision to either accept a takeover, sell into the 
market once it has been announced, or reject it in a way that is sub-optimal. 
This is because if there is some bias in the decision-making process that 
causes investor decisions to be sub-optimal, this can have a knock-on 
effect that undermines the board’s ability to make profit maximising 
decisions and will have a negative impact on the efficiency and 
productivity of the economy. 
The bias relevant here stems from the insight established by 
Kahneman and Tversky about the way humans perceive loss and gains. As 
previously stated, humans like gains only half as much as they hate losses; 
they are loss averse.111 Consequently, the point in time when a shareholder 
makes a decision about whether to accept or reject takeover bids will 
impact the likelihood of his or her accepting. This is because, depending 
on whether or not an offer has been made, shareholders are likely to frame 
the potential outcomes differently; sometimes as losses and sometimes as 
gains. 
This phenomenon, where people value what they have more than 
what they could have, even if it has the same nominal value, is called the 
endowment effect.112 The endowment effect holds that people are more 
loss-averse in regard to what they already have than what they could 
have.113 One is an out-of-pocket expense, and the other is regarded as an 
opportunity cost. Even if both the out-of-pocket expense and the 
opportunity cost are of the same nominal value, they are not treated equally 
by people. If an individual is given the chance to pay to avoid the risk of 
losing £100, they pay a higher value than they are willing to pay to obtain 
the chance to gain £100, even if the odds are the same. Mathematically, 
one may expect the price to be exactly the same, but in practice they will 
be valued differently because the first will be taken from one’s endowment 
while the other is simply an opportunity cost.114 
Now this has an impact when the information is applied to a 
situation where an investor is required to decide whether or not to accept 
an offer for their shares as part of a takeover bid. Consider the following 
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two scenarios by way of illustration: Person A has 500 shares in Cole Ltd. 
The shares generally trade around £1.00. A takeover offer is announced 
and each share increases in value to £1.25. Person A’s shares used to be 
worth £500, but now due to the offer they are worth £625. Person A is 
informed by Cole Ltd.’s board that they believe the offer undervalues the 
company, and in five years, when a particular investment in widget 
production has been completed, the shares will be worth £1.50. Person A 
now has a choice to make: accept the offer or sell into the market and 
realize the value of the shares instantly, or in the alternative, hold on to the 
shares and trust that the investment will pay off as described by the board. 
The difficulty is that if the offer is not accepted, that will almost certainly 
have immediate consequences for the share price. With the takeover 
rejected, the share price is highly likely to drop down to around £1.00 once 
more since the takeover premium has now evaporated. Given this 
situation, Person A’s decision can be described as follows: 
 
Action Benefit Likelihood Loss Likelihood 
Sell Obtain 
share value 











Obtaining the current value of the shares is all but certain if they 
sell. The loss, however, is contingent on the market behaving according to 
the prediction of Cole Ltd.’s board and so is less certain. But this is only 
part of the problem. Fundamental to this decision is that the increase in 
share value has already happened; Person A is in possession of £625 of 
shares. If the deal is rejected, the share price will return to its original 
position. Thus, if the deal is not completed, Person A will lose £125 in 
equity value, a loss that will be felt all the more keenly due to the innate 
dislike of loses above the like of gains. As a consequence, shareholders 
are likely to sell their shares to avoid losing their investment’s 
(£0.25p/share) value, rather than hold on for a (£0.25) gain, not just 
because the short-term loss is more certain than the long-term gain, but 
because the shareholder is more averse to losing 25p than they are inclined 
towards gaining 25p. 
 





Graph 1 and Graph 2 also illustrate this point. Starting with Graph 
1, if Point a is when an offer is made, Point b is when a shareholder has to 
decide whether to accept an offer, Point c when a rejected bid is dropped, 
and Point d the point where the board predicts the share price will be if the 
company is not taken over. Then, even if the shareholder thinks the bid 
undervalues the company, his risk aversion will naturally incline him 
towards avoiding the drop in value of the shares (y) he already has, rather 
than pursuing a possible gain (x) in future, even if they are around the same 
level. 
This is all further supported by research that suggests that market 
actors (and humans in general) have a “present bias.”115 This means that 
they are more likely to procrastinate immediate cost activities, such as 
paying more money into a pension scheme, and are more likely to 
preproperate activities that provide immediate benefits.116 Further an 
awareness of one’s propensity to make such flawed decisions can help 
reduce procrastination, but actually only intensifies preproperation.117 
Applying this to our current situation, this only serves to reinforce the 
point. If an investor holds shares in a company that is subject to a takeover 
announcement, when he is considering whether to accept an offer he will 
be subject to present bias. He can have an immediate payoff through the 
selling of his shares which will give him a bid premium, or he can hold his 
shares and benefit from a greater payoff when the company’s investments 
come to fruition. In this calculation, he will value the immediate payoff 
with a positive bias when comparing it to a payoff later after holding the 
shares for an extended period of time. 
 
                                                   
115 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 
(1999). See also Warren K. Bickel, Amy L. Odum & Gregory J. Madden, Impulsivity and cigarette 
smoking: delay discounting in current, never, and ex-smokers, 146 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 447 
(1999); Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time 
Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002); David Laibson, Golden Eggs 
and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443 (1997). 
116 To the author’s understanding, prior to thorough economic investigation this was called 
impatience. 
117 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 
(1999) 104–05, 109–12. 
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B. The solution 
 
The solution to this problem is to change the timing of the 
decision. This can be done by altering the Takeover Code to allow 
takeover defences to be approved by shareholders for a defined period of 
time in advance of takeover offers. Currently the rules state that: 
 
if the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a 
bona fide offer might be imminent, the board must not, without 
the approval of the shareholders in general meeting: 
 
(a) take any action which may result in any offer or bona fide 
possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied 
the opportunity to decide on its merits118 
 
This rule means that defending a takeover is in fact allowed by the 
Takeover Code, but only with the approval of the shareholders to defend 
the company from that particular takeover in a general meeting. This 
hinders the practical ability to implement takeover defences, unless a 
majority of shareholders would vote to allow their company to frustrate a 
takeover. It is likely that those same shareholders would vote against the 
takeover offer itself, so if such approval was possible, it would also be 
unnecessary.119 This situation can be changed if an additional clause is 
added to Rule 21.1: 
 
. . . unless the approval of the shareholders has been given for 
the board to take such action prior to an offer becoming 
imminent. Such approval must stipulate the following 
conditions: 
a) The duration of the permission to take such action (up 
to a renewable maximum of 10 years) 
b) The programme of investment for which the approval 
is requested 
c) The conditions upon which the approval becomes 
ineffective. In particular regarding an absolute or 
percentage change in share price or dividend or a 
deviation of such from a nominated sectoral 
benchmark 
 
                                                   
118 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, PRACTICE STATEMENT 
NO 32, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018. 
119 There is the theoretical possibility of takeover defences being approved prior to any 
imminent offer, which would be legitimate, but in reality such a defence is still likely to fall afoul of 
the rule because it would require some sort of action or inaction on behalf of the board to distinguish 
between takeovers the board considers desirable and those that are undesirable, for example, board 
dis/approval of the bid. This action would be considered frustrating action on behalf of the board 
rendering it once again a breach of the Code. 
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The effect of such a change would be substantial. It would make 
it possible for a board that has no imminent offers apparent to seek 
approval from shareholders to enter a period in which they are able to 
defend the company from takeovers, most likely through a poison pill style 
defence. The Rule would not allow a company to grant a perpetual 
permission to defend against takeovers. To prevent a board that had 
obtained approval from behaving in a way that is detrimental to the 
company, being comfortable in the knowledge that they are safe from a 
takeover, certain conditions will be required for the approval to remain 
effective. The most obvious of these are: that the share price should remain 
above a certain level, that dividends should do likewise, or that they should 
not deviate from a particular sectoral benchmark. The last possibility 
would be particularly useful as it would not invalidate the approval in 
times where, for reasons outside of the board’s control, the sector is unable 
to maintain profits or expansion at prior levels. It would be up to the 
shareholders to decide which particular measure is suitable.  
Implementing the above would allow boards to able to consider a 
long-term investment strategy and “pitch” it to shareholders. The pitch 
would include what the long-term aim would be, such as increasing market 
share, entering a new product or national market, developing a new 
technology, investing in more efficient plant machinery, and it would 
explain how long the program would be as well as any other relevant 
details that the board would be able to disclose without compromising the 
strategy itself. The pitch would set out the duration of the approval and the 
conditions upon which it would be invalidated, which will be referred to 
here as break clauses. Shareholders would then be able to decide whether 
they thought the program was worth giving up the ability sell the company 
to another. They would consider whether the program was viable and 
whether the board was trustworthy, honest, and capable of delivering what 
they were proposing. With this information they then decide whether to 
grant approval. 
 While an assessment of the feasibility of the proposed project, the 
reasonableness of the assumptions upon which it is based, and appropriate 
duration of such a project may be within the realms of calculation for 
major institutional shareholders and fund managers, it is clear that such an 
assessment may be beyond the ability of many other investors, not least 
retail investors. In order to counterbalance this situation it would also be 
necessary, when “pitching” a project to shareholders, for shareholders to 
appoint by vote an investment bank that investigates the proposal, 
produces a report on whether the projections, calculations, assumptions 
and time frame are reasonable, and gives an opinion on its overall merit. 
The bank would also advise on what sort of break clauses would be 
necessary and the appropriate benchmarks upon which to base them. It is 
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of paramount importance that it is the shareholders who select the bank, in 
order to ensure there is an incentive to investigate fully and effectively to 
please shareholders. Selection of the bank by the board would incentivise 
the bank to investigate superficially and perhaps optimistically, in a way 
that could be argued to currently blight the audit market.120 This would 
also provide the additional benefit of giving firms and shareholders the 
time to compare the market to get the best deal from banks and ensure that 
they have a reasonable period of time to evaluate the potential of the 
company carefully; two conditions that are absent when a bank is called 
upon to provide advice after a takeover has transpired.121 
This leads to the question: why would shareholders give up their 
freedom to accept a takeover offer? If UK companies are focused on short-
term results because they wish to protect their position and ergo their 
companies from being subject to takeovers, then UK shareholders are in 
fact being deprived of greater possible long-term returns, because the 
boards are not investing efficiently in order to generate the greatest 
possible gain in the long-term. By tying their own and fellow shareholders’ 
hands from accepting a takeover offer, it liberates the board to focus on 
the long-term and generate greater profits. The next logical question is: if 
shareholders cannot perceive the long-term value of investments now (and 
consequently choose to sell shares into an offer rather than hold them), 
why would they choose to approve defensive measures, which would 
require them to depend on long-term value creation over and above short-
term gains from potential takeovers? This can be answered by considering 
a table similar to the one above, but this time altered to reflect the scenario 
under the new non-frustration rule: 
 
 

















                                                   
120 Jonathan Ford, A defective auditing market that makes ‘lemons’ of us all, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/fddde450-2521-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0#comments-
anchor. 
121 See Neil Collins, Backing GKN management will be leap of faith for shareholders, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018) https://www.ft.com/content/48b715f8-2844-11e8-9274-2b13fccdc744 (“[T]he 
[target company], like a man with raging toothache, was not in a strong position to haggle over the 
fees and the idea that the final offer ‘fundamentally undervalues’ this venerable business . . . is mere 
takeover rhetoric from a board that can hardly know whether it does or not.”). 
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Comparing the tables, the difference becomes obvious. First, 
when considering pre-approval for a takeover defence, the benefits and 
losses incurred by the shareholder are now on an equal footing; the 
increase in the company’s value is uncertain, but the existence of a future 
takeover premium is uncertain also.122 The magnitude of any future 
takeover premium is also uncertain. Instantly, there is a change in the 
dynamics of the decision, the shareholder now considers two possible 
future scenarios, both of which are uncertain. Further, the insights of 
behavioural economics explain why there is another significant 
consideration. For this, we can look back at our example of Cole Ltd. 
Under current rules,123 Cole Ltd.’s share price increases from £1.00 to 
£1.25 when the offer is made and so, shareholders have £1.25 share value 
which if rejected, falls to £1.00. They are being asked whether they want 
to lose that same value by refusing the offer or potentially make greater 
gains in future. This is undesirable decision to give the investor because 
common sense shows that there is a greater dislike of losses as opposed to 
gains. This means they will be disproportionately concerned about losing 
the 25p value they already have thanks to the bid, as opposed to gaining 
25p more at a later date. 
Now contrast this situation to the decision under the new rule.124 
Under the new rule, Cole Ltd. has not yet undergone any offer. Its share 
price is around £1.00 and has been trading so for a while. Consequently, 
when the board asks for an eight-year approval of takeover defences for 
the purpose of investing in the latest plant machinery or expanding into a 
growing foreign market, the question posed to shareholders is whether 
they would rather seek to gain future profits through the company 
generating value or seek to gain a future premium through a takeover. 
There is no loss aversion because no actual loss will take place,125 their 
decision will essentially be between two competing types of gain, both of 
which at the point of decision making are hypothetical. The only losses are 
indirect, and are opportunity costs. This contrasts strongly with the 
original scenario where seeking long term value generation would lead to 
an immediate loss from the shareholders’ endowment as the share price 
drops reflecting the rejection of the takeover. 
                                                   
122 The level of certainty could be drastically different, but this would be for the shareholder 
to consider in each individual circumstance. Where the chance of generating value is low and the 
chance of a takeover premium high, shareholders will naturally refuse to approve takeover defences. 
Likewise, when the chance of generating value is high and the chance of a takeover premium is low, 
the shareholders will be more likely to approve takeover defences. 
123 See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra Section II.B. 
125 It is reasonable to expect that an approval of takeover defences will cause an opportunity 
loss that could be reflected in the share price, however, assuming that the shareholders have only 
approved takeover defences on the condition of investment that will lead to a commensurate increase 
in long term, value in these should balance out and the share price will remain largely stable. 





Reconsidering the graph originally shown above as Graph 1 (now 
labelled Graph 2 for easy comparison), we can now compare it to the 
situation where takeover defences are prohibited and compare it to the 
situation where the new model described above has been implemented. In 
Graph 2, Point “a” is when an offer is made, Point “b” is when a 
shareholder has to decide whether to accept an offer, Point “c” is when a 
rejected bid is dropped, and Point “d” is where the board predicts the share 
price will be if the company is not taken over. As before, even if the 
shareholder thinks a bid undervalues the company, their risk aversion will 
naturally incline them towards avoiding the drop in value of the shares 
they already have rather than pursuing a possible gain in future, even if 
they are around the same level. 
Now the situation can be contrasted by looking at Graph 3. In this 
situation, before any takeover is announced, the investor has to decide 
whether to allow takeover defences. This is marked at Point “b.” Although 
when making the decision, the investor has to consider that at any point 
between Point “b” and “d,” a takeover offer could be made which could 
allow them to benefit from an offer premium. Although this time, no 
endowment effect is possible because the bid premium has not yet come 
into existence. The shareholder has to decide on the current value of the 
shares compared to a hypothetical share premium that has not come into 
existence and consequently cannot exert an endowment effect upon the 
shareholder. A present bias would also have limited effect, since there 
would be no immediate benefit to selling the shares above and beyond the 
normal benefit of selling an investment. Here, all potential premiums 
would be in the future, thus exerting a weaker influence on the investor to 
overvalue immediate gains. By constraining these irrational biases, market 
actors should be able to behave more rationally and allow the market to 
function more efficiently. 
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This reform will also likely help the situation of the fund manager 
who is so concerned with their relative performance that they would sell 
into an offer that they believe undervalues the company. This is because 
the fund manager has to determine whether the firm in which they have 
invested their capital is able to deliver the higher returns that they are 
seeking to obtain during the proposed protected period. The fund manager 
does not need to worry about their relative performance come the next 
benchmarking period, because whether they approve takeover defences or 
not, there will be no immediate drastic change in the price of the shares in 
the same way that there would be if they held shares in a firm that had 
rejected a takeover offer. Therefore, whether the approval is given or not, 
it will not impact their position relative to competitor fund managers. 
 
C. The effect of implementation on boards and shareholders 
 
There are a number of effects that would be expected from the 
implementation of this change in the takeover rules. Primarily, it should 
decrease the pressure on UK companies to focus on the short-term and 
allow them to look further into the horizon when making plans relating to 
investment and the use of capital generally. It will be likely to also 
generate other positive effects, which are especially desirable in light of 
the UK’s productivity problem. Such a change in the Takeover Code will 
create an obvious incentive for boards to actively search out and find 
programs of investment that will give them a basis for seeking approval 
from shareholders to employ takeover defences. The motive behind this 
may be to protect their own position as best they can; as once they have 
received approval from their shareholders to use takeover defences, their 
own position is better secured. This may at first instance cause a number 
of investment programs to be presented and accepted that in time do not 
provide the fruits that were promised, but with time, the number of such 
programs should reduce and reach a low equilibrium. The reason for this 
is that once a program is agreed upon as a justification for approving 
takeover defences, it will be only a matter of time until the approval has 
run its course and the results are expected. Should those results not be 
secured, this will inevitably have a significant impact upon the trust the 
shareholders place in the board. Whether the board could not deliver 
because they deliberately misled shareholders or because, despite their 
best efforts, they simply could not deliver what they thought possible, it 
will mean that in the future, shareholders will be less likely to trust the 
verity of their statements as well as their competence to deliver results. 
This will likely mean the board will be less able to convince shareholders 
to permit further approvals for employing takeover defences and should 
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an offer arise, shareholders will be far less likely to believe the board when 
they say that they should not take the offer. This then will provide its own 
disincentive to misuse the approval process by inventing unrealistic, 
overly optimistic or false programmes of investment. To rephrase the 
words of John Smith: “[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect their plans of investment to be well 
considered and effective, but from their regard to their own interest.”126 
 It is also worth noting that such a reform will have a limited effect 
on the openness of UK businesses to inward investment and beneficial 
takeovers. First, friendly takeovers would not be inhibited. Second, due to 
the temporary nature of the protection, shareholders will never be 
prevented from taking advantage of takeovers on a lasting basis. This is 
essential for two reasons: first, as described above, this ensures that 
company boards have an incentive only to pursue genuine investment 
programmes and, second, where firms persistently fail to innovate, it is 
essential these firms can be taken over and replaced with new management 
as expected within the market for corporate control.127 This is made all the 
more important by the findings by Bloom and Van Reenen that low 
productivity is most pronounced in sectors where competition is weak.128 
Where there is little competition, it is all the more important that the threat 
of a new foreign entrant (for example, via acquiring an existing 
competitor) or the threat of a takeover drives the board of a company to 
continue to innovate and boost productivity. Notably however, with the 
proposed change, there should not be a drastic closing off of the market 
for corporate control within the UK, rather the timing and organisation of 
such takeovers will alter. 
These measures would therefore change the nature of takeover 
decision-making. Simply by altering the timing of the shareholders’ 
decision on whether to seek value generation or takeover premiums the 
rule change would put the shareholder into a position where they are likely 
to make more rational decisions. They would be comparing ‘like with like’ 
rather than long-term uncertain gains with almost certain short-term 
losses. As a consequence, whether the shareholder is a fund-manager or a 
retail investor their decision is more likely to be rational because they will 
balance the potential gains from either approving or disapproving takeover 
defences equally rather than being subject to, what is from an economic 
point of view, irrational loss aversion. 
 
                                                   
126 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (“It is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest.”). 
127 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 THE J. OF POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965). 
128 Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, Measuring and Explaining Management 
Practices Across Firms and Countries, 122 Q. J. OF ECON. 1351 (2007). See also Andy Haldane, Chief 
Economist, Bank of Eng., Productivity Puzzles Speech at LSE (Mar. 20, 2017). 




It has been seen that the UK takeover regulation appears to cause 
a focus on short-term profits potentially damaging long-term investment, 
which appears to be harming research and development while also causing 
low productivity growth in UK businesses. A number of possible answers 
to this problem have been considered including government intervention, 
disenfranchising shareholders, and increasing the acceptance threshold for 
takeover acceptance. While each of these proposals have their own merits 
and de-merits, it has been argued that they are insufficient for the present 
purposes. 
A new solution has been presented that harnesses the insights from 
behavioural economics. Under this new solution, prior to any takeover bid, 
a company’s board has the opportunity to present to shareholders a 
program of investment that they believe would greatly increase the value 
of their company in the medium to long-term. If shareholders consider this 
program sufficiently convincing and sufficiently profitable, they can 
acquiesce to a period of time where the board can implement the 
investment program and where necessary, implement takeover defences 
so that they are not at risk of being subject to a takeover simply because 
they have chosen to implement a long-term profitability strategy. 
It is argued that should such a policy be implemented, both 
research and development as well as investment will increase within UK 
companies and productivity will also increase in the medium to longer 
term after implementation. An increase in both investment and research 
and development would be likely to have a significant positive effect on 
productivity growth. As a result, this would help increase the standard of 
living, increase economic growth, and make the UK more competitive 
internationally. It would also ease the concerns of firms so that they would 
not feel it necessary to move to other jurisdictions where firms are more 
protected, and it would also do little to undermine the efficacy of the 
market for corporate control as a mechanism for maximising business 
efficiency. 
  
